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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOHN KIRILUK, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970200 
Priority No. 2 
In response to issues raised on appeal, the state distorts 
facts and makes inapplicable procedural arguments. On the merits, 
the state fails to provide factual or legal analysis, compelling 
the determination that this Court should reverse the conviction 
and remand the case for a new trial as set forth in the opening 
Brief of Appellant, and as further set forth herein. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATE SUPERFICIALLY ADDRESSES KIRILUK'S 
INVOCATION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER MIRANDA. 
A. THE STATE'S "DISPUTE" CONCERNING KIRILUK'S INVOCATION OF 
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL LACKS ANALYSIS. 
In a single-paragraph discussion relating to the first issue 
on appeal,1 the state acknowledges that Kiriluk invoked the 
1
 Kiriluk's opening Brief of Appellant contains an incomplete 
statement regarding the standard of review applicable to the first 
issue on appeal, which concerns the trial court's error in failing 
to suppress statements made by Kiriluk after he invoked rights per 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) . Kiriluk stated, "This 
Court will review the trial court's factual findings for clear 
error, and the conclusions of law under a correctness standard 
providing no deference to the trial court." (Opening Brief at 1 
(cites omitted).) The proper standard applicable here is 
identified in State v. Dahlquist, 931 P.2d 862 (Utah App. 1997): 
"When a trial court bases its 'ultimate conclusions concerning 
the waiver of defendant's Miranda rights...upon essentially 
undisputed facts, in particular the transcript of [an 
officer's] colloquy with defendant,' its conclusions present 
(continued...) 
right to silence during the in-custody interrogation, but claims 
the invocation did not trigger the right to counsel. In support, 
the state simply cites to Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452, 459 
(1994). (See State's Brief at 20.) The state fails to provide 
factual or legal analysis with respect to its position. (Id.) 
In addition, the state's claim lacks support in the record 
and in the law. As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant 
("Opening Brief"), Carr testified that during in-custody 
interrogation, he informed Kiriluk that drugs were found in the 
apartment. Carr told Kiriluk, "You're going to be arrested for 
that, okay? Now, [do] you want [to] make any statements in regard 
to that. [K]eeping in mind everything about you do have the right 
to remain silent. You do have the right to have an attorney, 
things of that nature." (R. 1204:33.) 
Kiriluk responded "I don't." (R. 12 04:34.) Carr defined the 
conditions of Kiriluk's cooperation, i.e. "keeping in mind" 
Kiriluk's right to remain silent and "to have an attorney." A 
reasonable police officer defining the circumstances would have 
understood the refusal to cooperate to be an invocation of the 
rights defined. See Davis, 512 U.S. 459 (right to counsel must be 
1(...continued) 
questions of law which we review under a correction of error 
standard." 
Id. at 866 (citing State v. Gutierrez, 864 P. 2d 894 (Utah App. 
1993)) . As stated in State v. Labrum, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah 
App. 1998), normally this Court would give deference to the trial 
court's findings: "However, the logic underlying this deference to 
the sentencing court does not apply when, as in this case," the 
court has based its findings on a transcript. Id. at 3 8 n.6. Since 
the findings relevant to the first issue are based in a transcript, 
this Court should give no deference to the trial court here. 
2 
articulated sufficiently so that reasonable officer in the 
circumstances would have understood it to be a request to invoke 
right to counsel); (see R. 385 (Carr admits that if he had 
realized Kiriluk said, "I don't," he would have discontinued 
interrogation because Kiriluk invoked Miranda rights)). The state 
does not dispute the clear transcript. As much as Kiriluk invoked 
the right to remain silent, he also invoked the right to counsel. 
In a separate statement, which also lacks analysis, the 
state claims that in closing argument, defense counsel argued 
that Kiriluk "never requested a lawyer" and he "cooperated with 
police in their investigation." (State's Brief at 20.) The state 
fails to identify why counsel's closing argument is pertinent 
here. To the extent the state relies on it as "evidence" that 
Kiriluk did not invoke the right to counsel, the state's reliance 
is misplaced for two reasons. 
First, counsel's statement simply reflects the substance of 
the trial court's ruling on the matter (see R. 477 where court 
determined Kiriluk did not invoke Miranda rights during 
interrogation). Second, counsel's statements in closing argument 
months later do not constitute "evidence," see State v. Arroyo, 
796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (citing Leon Shaffer Golnick Adv., 
Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So.2d 1015, 1017 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1982) 
(attorney's unsworn statements do not constitute evidence)), and 
likewise do not constitute circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation. See State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 225-26 (Utah 
1989) (in considering Miranda issue, court considers total 
3 
circumstances, including characteristics of accused and details 
of interrogation). 
The facts surrounding the interrogation support invocation 
of Miranda rights. The law prohibited the officers from further 
questioning under the circumstances. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 
91, 97-98 (1984); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 
(1981); People v. St.Pierre, 522 N.E.2d 61, 67-68 (111. 1988); 
Commonwealth v. Zook, 553 A.2d 920, 922-23 (Pa. 1989), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989); Christopher v. Fla., 824 F.2d 836, 
840-41 (11th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1077 (1988). 
B. THE STATE DOES NOT DENY THAT OFFICERS FAILED TO PROVIDE 
KIRILUK WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY 
BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH THE SECOND INTERROGATION. 
In Point I.D., the state asserts that notwithstanding 
Kiriluk's invocation of Miranda rights, "an approximate 2-hour 
break" and "fresh Miranda warning[s]" made subsequent questioning 
permissible. (State's Brief at 24-27.) In the Opening Brief, 
Kiriluk acknowledged that a suitable break and fresh Miranda 
warnings may be sufficient under Michicran v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 
(1975), to permit later questioning where defendant has invoked 
only the right to remain silent. (Opening Brief at 17.) 
However, where defendant has invoked the right to counsel, 
those steps are inadequate. (Id. at 17-18.) Officers may not 
proceed with questioning on any subject unless and until 
defendant is provided with the opportunity to consult with an 
attorney. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (when accused has invoked 
right to counsel, he "is not subject to further interrogation by 
4 
the authorities until counsel has been made available to him"); 
Dahlquist, 931 P.2d at 866; McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 
177 (1991) (once suspect invokes Miranda right to counsel with 
regard to one offense, "he may not be reapproached regarding any 
offense unless counsel is present").2 
Here, although there was a break in the interrogation and 
fresh warnings, Carr failed to permit Kiriluk to consult with 
counsel before he continued questioning. Kiriluk7s statements 
were obtained illegally. See Dahlquist, 931 P.2d at 866; Smith, 
469 U.S. at 97-98; Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. 
C. THE STATED ARGUMENTS REGARDING PROCEDURAL DEFECTS 
MISREPRESENT THE RECORD. 
2
 The state seems to suggest that the Utah Supreme Court has 
relied on Mosley to rule that where a defendant has asserted the 
Miranda right to counsel during interrogation, officers may 
continue questioning sometime later on another subject. (State's 
Brief at 25.) The state cites to State v. Newton, 682 P. 2d 295, 297 
(Utah 1984). That case does not stand for that proposition. 
In Newton, defendant was appointed counsel pursuant to the 6th 
Amendment in January 1982 when he was arrested for aggravated 
robbery. In April 1982, an officer met with defendant in connection 
with a forgery case. The officer advised defendant of his Miranda 
rights and defendant stated he would talk to the officer "without 
having an attorney present." .Id. at 296. The Utah Supreme Court 
ruled that defendant's rights per Miranda were not violated, since 
defendant specifically did not invoke those rights during custodial 
interrogation. Newton is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's 
ruling in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991) . 
In McNeil, the Court recognized that the 6th Amendment right 
to counsel is "offense-specific" while the Miranda right to counsel 
is "nonoffense-specific." A defendant who is appointed counsel un-
der the 6th Amendment for one offense, may later waive the Miranda 
right to counsel when questioned about other offenses. However, 
once defendant has asserted the right to counsel under Miranda 
officers are prevented from further questioning with respect to any 
crime until defendant has consulted with counsel. McNeil, 501 U.S. 
at 177. McNeil specifically disavows the state's claim that offi-
cers may continue interrogation on a different subject matter when 
defendant has invoked Miranda rights (see State's Brief at 26-27) . 
5 
The state asks this Court to refrain from ruling on the 
merits of the Miranda issue, and to rule that Kiriluk failed to 
properly preserve the issue for appeal. (State's Brief at Point 
I.B. and C.) The state's argument does not warrant consideration 
since Kiriluk properly preserved the Miranda issue. 
In the trial court, Kiriluk presented a motion to suppress 
evidence obtained in violation of the 4th Amendment.3 The motion 
involved the Miranda issue; Kiriluk argued that officers violated 
his rights per Miranda. (R. 459; 471-72.) 
Specifically, counsel for Kiriluk presented the Miranda 
issue to the court as follows: 
[John Kiriluk is] at the police station, and he's being 
questioned. They receive a phone call, after a search has 
been conducted, relating to the narcotics or alleged 
narcotic that was found in the apartment. At that point 
John invokes his right to Miranda. He clearly has not freely 
or voluntarily given his consent. They ask him, "Do you 
want to talk about this? Do you want to [be] questioned 
about that?" And his response was transcribed as, "I don't." 
• * * 
When there is an invocation of Miranda, even if Miranda has 
been given previously, [the duty] is at the very least to 
clarify. If there's an invocation of Miranda, the duty we 
all would recognize would be to stop questioning. But at the 
very least, [the officer] has a duty to clarify. And cer-
tainly the tape is going to speak for itself on that issue. 
(R. 459; 471-72.) The state also argued the issue: 
PROSECUTOR: As we come here, I think it's clear that the 
question is, do you want to make any statements in regard to 
anything that went on in your apartment that has to do with 
drugs? He says no. If we're taking this to be what 
happened. And he says no. He invoked Miranda. 
He doesn't say, "I don't want to talk to you," he just 
says, "No, I don't want to make any statements about any-
thing that goes on in the apartment about drugs.["] Boom. 
3
 Kiriluk raised the Fourth Amendment issue in the Opening 
Brief at Point II (see also Point II, infra). 
6 
That's not an invocation that he wants to cease or stop 
talking about anything, at all. And so when the other 
officer talks to him about wanting to search, that, again, 
has nothing to do with the questions about drugs or what 
went on in the apartment. 
(R. 465.) Presenting the 4th Amendment and Miranda issues 
together to the court in that fashion was efficient and elimi-
nated duplication since the issues overlapped. The trial court 
resolved the Miranda issue against Kiriluk before reaching the 
4th Amendment issue. (R. 477 (no Miranda violation--Kiriluk's 
responses to continued interrogation supported cooperation).) 
The issue was properly preserved for appeal; facts and legal 
arguments regarding the Miranda violation were presented to the 
trial court and the court made a ruling on the matter. (R. 477.) 
This Court should review the merits of the issue on appeal.4 
D. IN ITS PREJUDICE ARGUMENT, THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES THE 
IMPROPER USE OF EVIDENCE THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
The state claims that statements obtained in violation of 
Miranda were not prejudicial because "evidence of defendant's 
guilt was strong." (State's Brief at 27.) In support of that 
assertion, the state cites to the testimony of Chablis Scott 
4
 With respect to the state's claim that Kiriluk made a motion 
later regarding the Miranda violation and then withdrew that motion 
(see State's Brief at Point I.C.), closer inspection reflects that 
the motion was re-designated as a "motion to redact," and related 
to statements made by Kiriluk as to whether he was selling drugs 
from the apartment. (R. 522-23.) 
The new designation suggests the defense intended to argue 
that the prejudicial statements concerning other alleged criminal 
activity was inadmissible under the rules of evidence. However, the 
defense was not required to argue the bases for the "motion to 
redact" since the prosecutor agreed not to introduce those 
statements into evidence. Kiriluk has not made a challenge on 
appeal relating to the motion to redact or the statements that were 
the subject of the motion. 
7 
(Chablis), Rebecca Mumford (Rebecca) and Jolynn Penrod. The state 
disregards that evidence presented through those witnesses was 
circumstantial; Chablis and Rebecca presented credibility issues; 
and Jolynn was unable to testify with respect to events leading 
up to and surrounding the murder. (See Opening Brief, Point I.B.) 
The state seems to argue it presented evidence sufficient to 
support a conviction. Yet, the "sufficiency" standard is not 
enough under the prejudice analysis. Dahlguist, 931 P.2d at 867. 
Evidence must be so powerful and cumulative that the error would 
not have swayed the jury's judgment. Where the evidence was 
circumstantial and clouded with credibility concerns, the error 
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Id. 
Further, the state acknowledges that Kiriluk's statements 
were used to prove the state's case. (State's Brief at 28: Kiri-
luk's "statements consequently corroborated the State's motive 
theory".) The state's argument underscores the harm of the error. 
POINT II. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ASSERTION, KIRILUK ARGUES 
A 4TH AMENDMENT VIOLATION, WHERE THE CONSENT WAS COERCIVE 
AND/OR CONSTITUTED THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE. 
A. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT AT POINT II CONCERNING MIRANDA 
REMEDIES IS MISPLACED; KIRILUK IS NOT SEEKING A REMEDY UNDER 
MIRANDA FOR THE 4TH AMENDMENT VIOLATION. 
Contrary to the state's assertions (see State's Brief at 
29) , in Point II Kiriluk is not seeking 5th Amendment or Miranda 
protection in connection with a 4th Amendment violation. Rather, 
Kiriluk maintains that the 4th Amendment provides a remedy in 
this case for the illegal search. (Opening Brief, Point II.) 
Because the state's argument focuses on a 5th Amendment/Miranda 
8 
remedy, it is misplaced. 
Specifically, the state points out that courts considering 
the issue of excluding "non-testimonial" evidence obtained in 
violation of Miranda or the 5th Amendment, held that Miranda's 
exclusionary rule does not provide a remedy. (State's Brief at 
30); see U.S. v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir. 1993); 
U.S. v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(every federal circuit addressing the issue in terms of a Miranda 
violation has reached the conclusion that Miranda does not pro-
tect against non-testimonial consent to search) ; Cody v. Solem, 
755 F.2d 1323, 1329-30 (8th Cir. 1985) (court declines for proce-
dural reasons to address matter as a 4th Amendment issue); U.S. 
v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (5th Amendment 
does not protect consent obtained in violation thereof).5 
As set forth in Kiriluk's Opening Brief "Kiriluk is not 
seeking a remedy under Miranda law for the violation identified 
in this Point II. Kiriluk's remedy is under the 4th Amendment and 
its Utah counterpart." (Opening Brief at 25 and n. 7.) In the 
cases cited by the state, the defendant either never raised ex-
clusion of the "non-testimonial" evidence under the 4th Amend-
ment, or was procedurally barred from making such an argument. 
5
 Additional cases cited by the state are inapposite for 
various reasons. In Smith v. Wainwright, 581 F.2d 1149, 1151-52 
(5th Cir. 1978), the court refused to consider the issue in habeas 
corpus proceedings for procedural reasons. In U.S. v. Shlater, 85 
F.3d 1251, 1253-54, 1256 (7th Cir. 1996), defendant "invited" and 
"encouraged" officers to search his home before he was provided 
with his rights per Miranda. Likewise, in U.S. v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 
467 (9th Cir. 1977), officers obtained defendant's consent to 
search before they provided the Miranda warnings to him. 
9 
Thus, the issue was not addressed. Kiriluk's issue presents the 
4th Amendment overlay, which provides the appropriate remedy. 
To begin the analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court in Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), considered whether defendant had a 
remedy for suppressing an alibi witness's testimony where 
authorities questioned defendant in violation of Miranda. The 
defendant named the witness to authorities during the violative 
interrogation. The Tucker Court engaged in a two-part inquiry to 
determine whether a remedy existed to exclude the "non-
testimonial" information. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 439. The first 
part of the inquiry asked whether officers violated Miranda. The 
Tucker Court determined that a violation occurred. Id. at 445-46. 
In the second part of the analysis, the Court considered 
remedies. Miranda appeared to offer the only possible remedy 
since there was no other apparent violation alleged to have 
occurred and no other basis for excluding the evidence. The Court 
determined that the Miranda exclusionary rule served no useful 
purpose as a remedy in that case. Tucker, 417 U.S. 447. 
In this case, officers obtained consent in violation of 
Miranda. The state admits as much: Carr was at least "negligent" 
when he completely disregarded the invocation of Kiriluk's 
Miranda rights (State's Brief at 33-34), and Kiriluk invoked his 
rights making statements suppressible (id. at 23) . As a result 
of the Miranda violation, officers searched Kiriluk's apartment 
without a warrant, implicating the 4th Amendment. A remedy under 
that provision is available here; exclusion under the 4th 
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Amendment is well-established and will serve a valid purpose. 
In the search-and-seizure context the "prime purpose" of the 
exclusionary rule "is to deter future unlawful police conduct and 
thereby effectuate the guarantee of the 4th Amendment against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446 
(quoting U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). 
The exclusionary rule assumes that police have engaged in 
willful or negligent conduct which has deprived the defendant of 
some right. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447; (see also State's Brief at 
34 (admitting Carr's negligence)). 
The state does not dispute Kiriluk7s remedy under the 4th 
Amendment here. Exclusion would serve the purpose of requiring 
officers to pay attention to a defendant's responses. Officers 
should not be allowed to rely on their negligence to circumvent 
the requirements of Miranda and 4th Amendment law. See State v. 
Johnson, 576 A.2d 834, 846-47 (N.J. 1990) (court found that 
Miranda violation invalidated confession, and poisoned subsequent 
consent to search under 4th Amendment); U.S. v. Taft, 769 F.Supp. 
1295, 1304-06 (D.Vt. 1991) (consent violated 4th and 5th Amend-
ment rights; rational of Edwards supports that failure to honor 
request for counsel creates a coercive situation invalidating 
subsequent consent to search).6 The circumstances surrounding 
6
 In addition to the Miranda violation it is undisputed that 
at the time officers requested consent, Kiriluk was in custody in 
the early hours of the morning at the police station. Those factors 
are relevant to the total circumstances in determining that consent 
was coercive. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1219 (Utah 1993) 
(prosecution's burden in showing consent is particularly heavy if 
(continued...) 
11 
the consent to search here compel the determination that it was 
coercive, in violation of the 4th Amendment. 
B. THE EXPLOITATION ANALYSIS IS APPLICABLE AND COMPELLING; 
CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ASSERTIONS, IT WAS SPECIFICALLY AND 
PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR PURPOSES OF APPEAL. 
The state admits Kiriluk can prevail on the 4th Amendment 
claim where the "consent to search was somehow tainted by the 
preceding Miranda violation." (State's Brief at 31.) The state, 
however, urges the Court to avoid the merits of the exploitation 
analysis and to find that Kiriluk failed to properly preserve the 
issue for appeal. The state's urgings are non-meritorious. Kiri-
luk' s counsel presented the issue to the trial court as follows: 
The second issue is, if there is a prior illegality on 
the search, if they are there illegally, if -- on the 
Miranda issue if he's not invoked his Miranda, if there is 
valid consent, is it sufficiently attenuated from the 
illegality in this case? Is invokation [sic] of Miranda? And 
I would note that when you look at the tape, page 34, and 
where there's discussion about Miranda, page 37 is where 
there is a discussion of the consent. It's two, two and a 
half pages later. 
I know the one Utah case talks about attenuation 
between the prior illegality, then something that may have 
intervened, and then subsequent. In this case we don't 
believe there is sufficient attenuation. 
(R. 472; see also 459.) The trial court specifically ruled that 
6(...continued) 
defendant was in custody); U.S. v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723, 730 (5th 
Cir. 1973) (arrest is a factor militating against finding consent; 
arrestee is more susceptible to possible duress or coercion); U.S. 
v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260, 1264-65 (9th Cir. 1973) (circumstances 
invalidating consent consisted of the following: defendant's 
arrest, he was given formal Miranda warnings, the interrogation 
over a period of approximately two hours, and the defendant was 
held at station house); State v. Rushton, 870 P.2d 1355, 1361 
(Mont. 1994) (Miranda violation is a relevant factor negating the 
consent to search) . 
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consent was voluntarily given. (R. 479.)7 
With respect to the merits of the issue, the state 
incorrectly applies a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to 
the matter to determine coercion. That analysis would render the 
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine meaningless. Indeed, case 
law reflects that consent can be voluntary, but invalid as the 
fruit of a prior illegality. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 
(1975); U.S. v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1990). Under 
the exploitation doctrine, courts consider the proximity in time 
between the illegality and otherwise valid consent, intervening 
circumstances, and the purpose/flagrancy of the police 
misconduct. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993). 
Here, the state does not dispute that (1) Kiriluk at least 
7To the extent the state claims that the trial court's 
findings were not altogether complete, this Court is required to 
assume the trial court found facts in accord with its decision. In 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court 
considered a search and seizure issue that involved inadequate 
factual findings from the trial court. Id. at 1130. That did not 
deter the Utah Supreme Court from ruling on the merits of the 
issue. Rather, " [b]ecause the trial court's written findings do 
not describe the circumstances giving rise to this case, we look to 
the record of the suppression hearing for the relevant facts." 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1129. 
The Utah Supreme Court commanded that "when a trial court has 
failed to make findings of fact on the record, we will 'assume that 
the [trial court found facts] in accord with its decision' whenever 
it would be 'reasonable to assume that the court actually made such 
findings.'" Id. at 1130 (citing State v. Ramirez, 817 P. 2d 774, 
787-88 & n. 6 (Utah 1991)); see also State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 
1144, 1148-49 (Utah 1996) (appellate court can consider undisputed 
facts to dispose of matter). The Lopez court considered facts of 
record to support findings that were not expressly made. 
Lopez is controlling here. Kiriluk specifically raised the 
exploitation issue, and the trial court in Kiriluk's case 
explicitly found that the consent was voluntary. (R. 479.) Implicit 
in the ruling is that the exploitation argument failed. The issue 
is properly before this Court for consideration on the merits. 
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invoked his rights per Miranda with respect to drugs/activities 
at the apartment; (2) notwithstanding the invocation, Carr 
continued to interrogate Kiriluk regarding that subject; and (3) 
without hesitation or a break in the interrogation on the 
specific subject matter, within minutes of the invocation, Carr 
turned the interrogation over to Winters to obtain consent to 
search the apartment for drug-related evidence. (R. 1204: 34-37.) 
The state asserts that because Carr was "negligent" in 
failing to acknowledge the invocation of Kiriluk's Miranda 
rights, the continued interrogation and request to search cannot 
be construed as purposeful or flagrant, and that any violation in 
any event of the 4th Amendment would not warrant suppression of 
the evidence here since no deterrent value would be served. 
(State's Brief at 33-35.) 
Carr's conduct in disregarding a clear Miranda invocation 
was obvious and cannot be condoned. When an officer provides a 
suspect with Miranda rights and asks if the suspect is willing to 
cooperate keeping those rights in mind, the officer should be 
required to listen for the answer and to pay attention to it. 
Otherwise, officers will be permitted to trample important rights 
on the basis that the officer neglected to pay attention. 
Because the exclusionary rule is calculated to compel respect for 
constitutional rights, application of the rule would serve an 
important purpose in this case. See People v. Superior Court, 53 0 
P.2d 585, 588 (Cal. 1975) (consent was fruit of illegal 
interrogation where, upon receiving Miranda warnings, defendant 
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stated he did not want to discuss case, yet police subjected him 
to interrogation and then obtained permission to search 
premises); People v. Cleburn, 782 P.2d 784, 787 (Colo. 1989); 
State v. Wolfe, 657 P.2d 227, 229 (Or. 1983). 
With respect to the state's claim that Winters' interroga-
tion and requests cannot be construed as exploitation of the 
prior illegality (State's Brief at 34), the state is incorrect. 
Here, Carr failed and refused to pay attention to Kiriluk's 
invocation while the interrogation was in Carr's control, then he 
specifically turned the matter over to Winters to obtain consent 
to search the apartment. The taint cannot be purged by handing 
the baton to another officer. It is undisputed that after Kiriluk 
invoked his rights, Carr allowed Winters to question Kiriluk and 
obtain his consent to search. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 
687-88 (1988), prohibits the government from circumventing 
constitutional rights with use of such tactics. The state has 
failed to articulate an exception to this established doctrine. 
With respect to the prejudice analysis, the state again 
fails to identify any "direct evidence of the murder." Rather, 
it attempts to dilute the importance of the prosecutor's "key" 
evidence going to the "motive theory." (State's Brief at 35.) The 
state also disregards that additional evidence in this case was 
circumstantial and clouded with credibility concerns. (See 
Opening Brief, Points I.B. & II.C.) 
POINT III. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ASSERTION, KIRILUK'S 
OBJECTION TO WINTERS' TESTIMONY IDENTIFIED THE FACTORS UNDER 
RIMMASCH THAT MUST BE PROVEN BY THE STATE BEFORE SUCH 
CONCLUSIVE TESTIMONY MAY BE ADMITTED. 
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The state asserts Kiriluk failed to properly preserve his 
objections to Winters' testimony that liquid found in Kiriluk's 
apartment constituted precursor. (State's Brief at 36-38.) Yet, 
Kiriluk objected to the testimony on foundational grounds and on 
the basis that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. 
The state disregards that Kiriluk's objections mirrored the 
factors set forth in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). 
Under Rimmasch, and State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 
1996) , before admitting scientific conclusions into evidence, the 
state is required to prove (1) the inherent reliability of under-
lying techniques used to determine the conclusions; (2) proper 
application of the techniques; and (3) that the evidence is more 
probative than prejudicial. Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641. The Utah 
Supreme Court classified the first two factors as "foundational." 
Id. at n.2; see Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 403. The third factor 
concerns Rule 403, Utah R. Evid. See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641. 
Specifically, counsel for Kiriluk stated the following in a 
pre-trial hearing where he objected to the testimony: 
MR. MAURO [COUNSEL FOR KIRILUK:] The substance found in the 
house was apparently some substance in a pickle jar. I 
don't know what that was. But my guess is that Detective 
Winters will testify that he believed the substance was used 
in the manufacture of methamphetamine. And, again, we think 
there are foundational problems with no toxficolocrvl test, 
and we think it's not relevant under 401 and 402. It's not 
relevant under 404 and subject to 403 because it's more 
preju[di]cial than probative. 
COURT: So what you're talking about is the witness will 
testify that he observed the chemical, flex tubing, whatever 
else in the home, that was not retained. It will not be 
presented for evidence, he'll simply testify that it's 
consistent with a methamphetamine lab or chemical lab; is 
that what you're saying. 
[PROSECUTOR]: I'm not introducing that. I have no intent 
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to ask any questions about beakers or flasks or trying to 
make amphetamines. 
What I do have is that he found a beaker of a substance 
which he will testify is a precursor to methamphetamine. 
The defense has already gone into that.[8] We had a 
hearing where they asked them all these questions, and they 
testified that that stuff, in my opinion, is a precursor to 
methamphetamine. 
And that's all I want, is that there was a jar full of 
this liquid, it's a precursor for methamphetamine. It goes 
along with the state's theory that this is what this whole 
murder is about. So that it's a precursor to 
methamphetamine, that's all I want to get it in for. 
MR. MAURO: There's a foundational problem to that, because 
we don't have any documentmentation [sic! to prove that, and for the officers to just say, we found a pickle iar in the 
house with a precursor chemical to methamphetamine, I don't 
think there's an adequate foundation that the court should 
allow that evidence in. 
COURT: All right. The objection is overruled.... 
(R. 564-66 (emphasis added).)9 At trial, counsel again objected 
on foundational grounds to Winters' testimony that the liquid was 
a precursor. (R. 940-41.) 
The objections plainly concerned the lack of scientifically 
acceptable techniques used to establish the conclusion.10 No 
other interpretation can be given to the foundational objections, 
8
 The prosecutor's statement, "the defense has already gone 
into that," refers to testimony at the pre-trial motion to suppress 
hearing. There Winters testified that he observed items in the home 
that he "believed" to be precursor based on his experience (R. 441-
42; 449). However, because the items "weren't necessary in this 
case" they were not seized. (R. 449.) 
9
 Notwithstanding the record, the state makes the incredible 
assertion that Kiriluk made no appropriate objection "nor any 
timely objection on even general foundational grounds" to preserve 
this issue on appeal. (State's Brief at 38 (emphasis added) .) The 
state completely disregards plain, pre-trial objections contained 
in the record. 
10
 Reference in the objection to the toxicology report concerns 
chemical analysis and science. See Webster's Ninth Collegiate 
Dictionary 1248 (1985) (toxicology defined as "a science that deals 
with poisons and their effect and with the problems involved"). 
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and the state offers none. The issue was properly preserved. 
With respect to the merits, if Winters had merely testified 
that items found in the apartment were "consistent" with the use 
or manufacture of methamphetamine (testimony concerning mere 
observations), the evidence may have been admissible. However, 
Winters testified conclusively that a jar contained a precursor 
for methamphetamine --a scientific fact. (R. 955.) 
Winters' "conclusions" were more prejudicial than probative, 
lacked foundation, and were unreliable. Also, they were sus-
picious; they were not based in a toxicology report that the pro-
secutor possessed but never disclosed. (R. 951.) "[I]t can be 
said that evidence not shown to be reliable cannot, as a matter 
of law, 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine a fact in issue' and, therefore, is inadmissible." 
Crosby, 927 P.2d at 640. The testimony was impermissible. 
The state does not deny that the trial court committed error 
as a matter of law under Rimmasch and Crosby in permitting 
Winters' conclusions into evidence. 
With respect to the state's prejudice analysis, the state 
asserts that other evidence challenged on appeal as inadmissible 
supports the determination that the error was harmless.11 The 
state also relies on the circumstantial evidence and testimony of 
witnesses presenting credibility concerns. (See State's Brief at 
39.) That evidence is inconclusive. Here, the jury likely relied 
on Winters' conclusive and improper testimony to find "motive" 
11
 The state relies on the methamphetamine recipe which Kiriluk 
has challenged as inadmissible. (See Opening Brief, Point II.) 
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and to convict Kiriluk. Without the inadmissible evidence, there 
existed a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
Kiriluk. 
POINT IV. THE STATE #S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE SEROLOGY 
TESTS ARE ILLOGICAL. 
The state asserts Kiriluk's argument concerning the state's 
discovery violation "lacks merit because it is not clearly estab-
lished that a serology test was ever conducted. Moreover, defen-
dant cannot show that he ever anticipated blood would be found on 
Damon's t-shirt and was therefore prejudiced by testimony that no 
blood was found thereon." (State's Brief at 40.) 
With respect to whether testing was conducted, the state ac-
knowledges Carr's testimony to that effect. Incredibly, however, 
the state asserts "defendant has failed to establish...that the 
report in question ever existed." (Id. at 42.) The state is in-
correct. The record supports that testing occurred. In addition, 
once Kiriluk made the discovery request for serology test results 
(R. 43-45, 69-70, 133-37), he had no further obligation here. 
The duty belonged to the prosecutor to respond completely 
and honestly to the discovery request. See State v. Archuleta, 
850 P.2d 1232, 1242-43 (Utah) (prosecutor's duty to respond is 
continuous and applies when prosecutor voluntarily produces 
information), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 979 (1993). 
The state suggests the prosecutor had no duty to report the 
results because "he was unaware that any serology test had been 
conducted and no [] report had been provided [to] him." (State's 
Brief at 42.) That is insufficient. For discovery purposes, 
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"[i]nformation known to police officers working on a case is 
charged to the prosecution since the officers are part of the 
prosecution team. Neither the prosecutor nor officers working on 
a case may withhold exculpatory evidence or evidence valuable to 
a defendant." State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984) 
(cites omitted). In this case, the state failed to advise the 
defense with respect to results -- all the while allowing the 
defense to believe that no analysis or test was conducted. The 
state violated its obligation to provide continuing discovery by 
failing to advise the defense of the truth. 
The state does not dispute that to the extent a "test" or 
"examination" was not conducted, it was error for the trial court 
to permit Carr to testify with respect to serology test results. 
(See Opening Brief, Point IV.B.) Carr had no qualifications that 
would allow him to testify that no blood was found on the shirt, 
and there was no basis for the testimony. Carr's testimony also 
was more prejudicial than probative in violation of Rimmasch, 775 
P.2d 388. The state's failure to address the merits of Point 
IV.B. set forth in Kiriluk's Opening Brief compels the deter-
mination that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony. 
As for the state's claim that Kiriluk suffered no prejudice, 
the state relies in part on the trial court's determination that 
"in light of evidence adduced that both codefendant and defendant 
'were in the presence of the deceased' at the time of the mur-
der," serology results would not have impacted defendant's case. 
(State's Brief at 41.) The trial court and state both disregard 
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that evidence allegedly placing Kiriluk in the presence of the 
victim at the time of the murder was circumstantial and clouded 
with credibility issues. (See Opening Brief, Points I.B. & IV.C.) 
The trial judge improperly made credibility and sufficiency 
determinations to justify admitting the baseless testimony into 
evidence. See State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989) 
(the sufficient-evidence analysis "is not the standard by which 
harmless error determinations are to be made"). 
As for the state's assertion that "defendant cannot show 
that he ever anticipated blood would be found on Damon's t-shirt" 
(State's Brief at 40), that is incorrect.12 Kiriluk's counsel 
explained to the trial court that the defense anticipated that 
blood would be found on the shirt. (R. 1023.) Kiriluk's defense 
was that Damon alone took the victim to the tree and murdered 
him. (R. 1021-23.) Since the state presented only circumstantial 
evidence and evidence clouded with credibility issues in its 
case, it is reasonably likely that there would have been a more 
12
 The state also asserts that defendant failed to adduce 
evidence supporting his defense. (State's Brief at 42.) That 
assertion improperly suggests Kiriluk carried the burden of proof 
here, and is in direct conflict with Utah law. See State v. Knoll, 
712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985). 
Kiriluk's burden was limited. See State v. Tebbs, 786 P. 2d 
775, 779 (Utah App. 1990) . A defendant assumes the burden of 
producing some evidence (i.e. that blood was found on Damon's 
shirt) only if the state's evidence failed to provide some kind of 
evidentiary foundation for the defense. Id. at 779 (citations omit-
ted) ; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-504 (1995). That is, since the state 
led Kiriluk to believe that it had not tested the shirt, Kiriluk 
reasonably believed the state would not be able to use the shirt to 
discredit his defense that Damon murdered the victim. The state's 
lack of evidence would have provided a foundation for the defense. 
Kiriluk had no obligation here. Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214. 
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favorable result in this case for Kiriluk if the baseless 
evidence had not been presented. 
The improper, surprise evidence presented by the state 
suggested Damon did not murder the victim, thereby directly 
inculpating Kiriluk. Because the state disregarded discovery and 
evidentiary rules in presenting the evidence, Kiriluk was denied 
the opportunity to consider the test results and to present 
evidence concerning deficiencies in the testing. Kiriluk also was 
prevented from questioning the techniques and methods used. 
Reversal'is appropriate here. 
POINT V. THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT PREJUDICIAL 
HEARSAY TESTIMONY WAS PRESENTED TO THE JURY. 
The state claims Kiriluk waived his objection to hearsay 
testimony elicited by the state from Rebecca. The state 
disregards that the Utah Supreme Court did not reject an argument 
on procedural grounds that was presented under similar circum-
stances in State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 267 (Utah 1998). In 
that case, the Utah Supreme Court considered an objection on the 
merits even though the objection was made after the witness 
finished testifying. Id. That case is analogous to this matter. 
In addition, the trial court here entertained the merits of 
the hearsay objection and initially agreed to provide a 
cautionary instruction to the jury concerning the inadmissible 
testimony. (R. 934; 942.) Because the trial court addressed the 
issue on the merits, this Court is required to consider the issue 
on appeal. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 
1991); State v. Belcrard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992). 
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With regard to the merits, the state claims that "defense 
counsel opened the door" to the admission of otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay evidence, and that the hearsay statements 
were against the declarant's (Damon's) interest and therefore 
admissible. The state's assertions are legally incorrect. 
Rebecca's objectionable hearsay testimony was elicited by 
the prosecutor on re-direct after cross-examination. During 
cross by the defense, Rebecca disclosed that Damon made state-
ments concerning his own involvement in the offense. (R. 927.) On 
redirect, the prosecutor asked "What else did Damon tell you ..." 
Rebecca disclosed that Damon said Kiriluk "slashed [Brown's] 
throat and then stabbed him in one side and it came out the 
other." (R. 930-31.) 
The state relies on Rule 804(b)(3), Utah R. Evid., to assert 
the objectionable hearsay statement was admissible as a statement 
against declarant's (Damon's) interest. Since the Utah rules are 
based on the federal rules, see Prelim. Note to Utah R. Evid., it 
is proper to examine decisions under the federal rules here. See 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333 (Utah 1986). 
Federal courts have separated a declarant/codefendant's 
statements into two categories: those implicating declarant only 
in the offense, and those implicating other parties. The first 
category of statements is admissible while the second category 
does little to subject declarant to liability. 
The second category of statements is inadmissible hearsay. 
Those statements are usually made to shift or decrease criminal 
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liability from declarant to another party. A declarant does 
little to demonstrate the trustworthiness and reliability 
necessary under the hearsay exceptions by taking on the blame of 
a minor role and shifting the greater portion of blame to 
another. See U.S. v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878, 883 (10th Cir.) (to 
the extent a statement not against declarant's interest is 
severable from other statements satisfying Rule 804(b)(3), such 
statement should be excluded), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); 
State v. Lilly, 581 F.2d 182, 188 (8th Cir. 1978); see also, Lee 
v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) ("Due to his strong 
motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a 
codefendant's statements about what the defendant said or did are 
less credible than ordinary hearsay evidence" (quoting Bruton v. 
U.S., 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968) (in the context of codefendant's 
statements and the confrontation clause)).13 
With regard to the state's "open-door" argument, even if 
defense counsel "opened" a door by eliciting statements from 
Rebecca concerning Damon's participation in the murder, those 
statements would not allow the court to admit hearsay statements 
in violation of the rules of evidence. See U.S. v. Hazelett, 32 
F.3d 1313, 1317-18 (8th Cir. 1994) (unavailable declarant's 
narrative is not admissible under 804(b)(3) merely because a 
portion of the narrative was admitted into evidence). 
Finally, there was no invited error. Counsel objected after 
13
 The state does not dispute that Kiriluk's rights under the 
confrontation clause were violated by admission of the hearsay 
statements. (See Opening Brief at 47-49.) 
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Rebecca testified, and requested that the trial court provide the 
jury with a cautionary instruction. (R. 934; 942.) That is all 
that was required to preserve the issue. The trial court's later 
refusal to give an instruction unless Kiriluk submitted it in 
writing was unprecedented and unnecessary to preserve the issue. 
POINT VI. THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE APPLIES HERE. 
Throughout its brief, the state disputes the prejudice of 
the errors, relying on Rebecca, Chablis and Jolynn's testimony, 
which consisted only of circumstantial evidence and was clouded 
with credibility concerns. The state also relies on evidence that 
Kiriluk has challenged as inadmissible on appeal.14 
The trial court compensated for the state's lack of direct 
evidence by admitting evidence obtained in violation of (1) Kiri-
luk' s rights per Miranda, (2) the 4th Amendment, (3) Rimmasch, 
(4) a prosecutor's duty to provide continuing discovery, and (5) 
the hearsay rules. The errors should undermine this Court's 
confidence that a fair trial was had. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and herein, 
this matter should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
14
 For example, in connection with Points I.E. and II.D., the 
state asserts that any error in admitting the evidence in question 
was not prejudicial, and relies on Rebecca's testimony concerning 
Damon's hearsay statements, which is at issue at Point V. In 
connection with Point III, the state claims that allowing Winters 
to testify definitively to the scientific properties of the liquid 
was not prejudicial in part because a methamphetamine recipe was 
admitted into evidence. Yet, Kiriluk challenged the admissibility 
of the recipe in Point II. 
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